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Wamsley: You [Might] Have the Right to Remain Silent: Examining the Mirand

You [MIGHT] HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT:
EXAMINING THE MIRANDA PROBLEM

(UNITED STATES v. WRIGHT, 777 F.3D 769 (5TH CIR. 2015))
Megan E. Wamsley*
I. INTRODUCTION
Every American with a television knows the phrase "you have the
right to remain silent" and has had the opportunity to hear it on every
televised crime drama imaginable. 1 While this phrase is commonplace
today, many Americans take their right to remain silent for granted.
Furthermore, some do not consider the possibility that the circumstances
surrounding police questioning may affect their right to remain silent.
This ignorance of the law has led to serious consequences. To date,
1,772 people in the United States alone have been exonerated 2 of a
crime for which they were previously convicted.3 These statistics
demonstrate that the American criminal justice system has an
unfortunate history of convicting innocent people and that something is
going wrong during criminal investigation.
Recently, several courts noted confusion regarding whether courts
may punish post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence by presenting that silence
as substantive evidence of guilt at trial. This confusion has resulted in a
split between circuits. The Supreme Court has unexplainably denied
certiorari4 on this issue several times, only muddling the matter even
further. Courts have begun focusing on definitions and textual analyses
to determine a citizen's rights instead of framing the question within a
constitutional analysis. In reality, the question is quite simple: When is
a citizen required to speak to the police?
The split has resulted in inconsistent holdings in lower courts, causing
unpredictable results and a pool of conflicting decisions. A majority of
the state court cases have held that the prosecution may not use evidence
of a defendant's post-arrest, pre-Mirandawarning silence as substantive6
evidence of guilt. 5 In contrast, the circuits are evenly split on this issue.
* Associate Member, University of CincinnatiLaw Review, 2014-15.
1. See Richard A. Leo, Panel Three: Miranda's Irrelevance: Questioning the Relevance of
Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1000, 1001 (2001).
2. "Exonerated" means "to prove that someone is not guilty of a crime." See Exonerate, THE
LAW DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org/exonerate (last visited Mar. 24, 2016).
EXONERATIONS,
OF
REGISTRY
NAT'L
3. See
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/featured.aspx (last visited Apr. 18, 2016).
4. Certiorari occurs when a higher courts agrees to examine the decision of a lower court. See
Certiorari,THE LAW DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org/certiorari (last visited Mar. 24, 2016).
5. E.g., Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387 (Wyo. 1995), Taylor v. Commonwealth, 495 S.E.2d
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On September 10, 2014, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania heard
Commonwealth v. Molina, a decision concerning a citizen's right against

self-incrimination. 7 In 2003, Michael Molina was suspected of the
beating and subsequent murder of a female. 8 The prosecution relied
heavily on Mr. Molina's refusal to accompany the police to the station

for questioning as substantive evidence of his guilt at trial. 9

The

Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to determine
whether the prosecution may use a defendant's pre-arrest silence as
substantive evidence of guilt, but encountered difficulty because of the
unclear jurisprudence within the State and federal court systems.1 0
The Molina court found the federal jurisprudence unclear and
confusing and elected to ignore it, instead looking to the legislative

history behind Pennsylvania's self-incrimination clause. It held that
Pennsylvania citizens have the right against self-incrimination through
the Pennsylvania Constitution, which contains a self-incrimination
clause almost identical to that in the Fifth Amendment. 1
This
demonstrates that the federal jurisprudence on this issue is so
inconclusive that state supreme courts are unable to find a persuasive

line of cases in either direction. This lack of definition is caused by a
series of mistakes, confusion, and complications in the analysis of an
arrestee's silence.
This Casenote analyzes the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v.
Wright, a case that examines the post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence issue
in depth. Part II then examines the Supreme Court jurisprudence on the
issues surrounding the right against self-incrimination. Part III presents

the relevant circuit court opinions on this issue and their conflicting
holdings. Part IV presents Wright and its analysis of the issue. Part V

considers the Fifth Circuit's misapplication of the Fifth Amendment,
Miranda, and the circuit court opinions.

Part V also proposes two

522 (Va. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Easter, 922 P.2d 1285 (Wash. 1996); State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339
(Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Leach, 807 N.E.2d 335 (Ohio 2004); State v. Boston, 663 S.E.2d 886
(N.C. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Cassavaugh, 12 A.3d 1277 (N.H. 2010); State v. Rowland, 452 N.W.2d
758 (Neb. 1990); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 725 N.E.2d 556 (Mass. 2000); State v. Lovejoy, 89
A.3d 1066 (Me. 2014); State v. Moore, 965 P.2d 174 (Idaho 1998); People v. Welsh, 58 P.3d 1065
(Colo. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Fencl, 325 N.W.2d 703 (Wis. 1982). However, a few courts have held to
the contrary. See State v. Lopez, 279 P.3d 640 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012); People v. Schollaert, 486 N.W.2d
312 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Borg, 806 N.W.2d 535 (Minn. 2011); State v. Masslon, 746 S.W.2d
618 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); State v. LaCourse, 716 A.2d 14 (Vt. 1998).
6. See infra Part III.
7. Commonwealth v. Molina, 104 A.3d 430 (Pa. 2014).
8. Id. at 433.
9. Id. at 434.
10. Id. at432.
11. Id. This section of the Pennsylvania Constitution reads, "[A person] cannot be compelled to
give evidence against himself." PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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solutions for how the Fifth Amendment, Miranda, and the circuit court

opinions should be interpreted in the future in order to uphold the spirit
of Miranda. Finally, Part VI will conclude that the Supreme Court
should reinterpret Miranda within a modem context to respect the intent
of the Fifth Amendment.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Fifth Amendment

The Fifth Amendment was introduced in 1791 as one of the original
Amendments in the Bill of Rights. 12 It reads, in relevant part, "[no
person] shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against

himself."13 The history of the Fifth Amendment is unclear, but can be
traced back to an "oath ex officio," an oath requiring defendants to agree
to truthfully answer any question asked of them. 14 Basically, a

defendant could be brought in front of a court for any reason and forced

to take the oath. 15 If a defendant refused to take the oath, he or she was
subject to a fine, sometimes imprisonment. 16 In response, some people
started to quote "maxim nemo tenetur seipsum prodere" to protest taking

the oath, which means, "no man is bound to [accuse] himself.'

17

This

was likely the earliest example of people attempting to exercise the right

against self-incrimination now codified within the Fifth Amendment.
B. When Can You Pleadthe Fifth?

In 1955, the Supreme Court addressed the scope of the Fifth
Amendment in Quinn v. U.S., a case where three men taken in for
questioning declined to answer any questions. 18 The Court began its

analysis by explaining the history of the Fifth Amendment and

12. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 164 (1955).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The entire Amendment reads: "No person shall be held to answer
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." (emphasis added).
14. 1 CRIM. PROC. § 2.10(c) (4th ed. 2015).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 157 (1955).
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19
examining the Founders' intent in introducing the Amendment.
Importantly, the Court held "the Self-Incrimination Clause must be
accorded liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to
secure." Additionally, Quinn found that the Fifth Amendment does not
need to be explicitly invoked.2 ° It stated that "the fact that a witness
expresses his intention in vague terms is immaterial so long as the claim
is sufficiently definite to apprise the committee of his intention. 2 1 In
other words, if the police officer conducting the interrogation should
reasonably believe that an arrestee might be invoking his right against
self-incrimination, the officer should stop the interrogation.
Quinn effectively broadened a citizen's ability to invoke the Fifth
Amendment. As a result, the majority of the circuits' opinions first ask
whether a suspect's conduct was sufficient to invoke the protection of
the Fifth Amendment and second, whether the circumstances warranted
protection by the Fifth Amendment.22 This issue arises when courts
consider at what point in time a suspect may properly invoke Fifth
Amendment rights. Simplified, this is an issue focused on timing.
When does the Fifth Amendment protect a suspect?

C. You Have the Right to Remain Silent
Miranda v. Arizona was decided in 1966 amidst serious police
misconduct and manipulation of arrestees. 23 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Miranda because of the confusion surrounding the
application of a citizen's right against self-incrimination. Several cases
were pending in front of the Court with a similar fact pattern: the police
had arrested someone, convinced that person that it was better to talk to
the police openly than to stay silent or get an attorney, confused them,
and then elicited an allegedly false confession. Miranda held that
"when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to
24
questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized.,
Miranda placed upon police officers a duty to recite the Miranda
warnings to an arrestee as soon as she was within their custody. At the
time Miranda was decided, the Supreme Court thought the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination was so important that it
required every police officer in the nation to warn an arrestee that "he
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 161.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 164.
See infra Part IV.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id.at 478.
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has the right to remain silent.
,25 However, is this how the American
judicial system still reads Mirandatoday?
D. The Confusion Behind Custody
The Miranda majority opinion states several times that an arrestee has
the right to remain silent and that the arresting officer must read the
arrestee her Miranda rights before engaging in "custodial" or "incustody interrogation." 26 Although the Court may not have intended to
make this distinction, a gray space was created around the definition of
"custodial." It also limited the Fifth Amendment by inadvertently
implying that the right to remain silent only applies when an
interrogatee is in the custody of the police. The main issues in this
circuit split are the courts' confusion about the application of the Fifth
Amendment and, subsequently, their struggle to define "custodial" and
"interrogation."
In 1995, the Supreme Court heard Thompson v. Keohane and
established the two-part Keohane test to determine whether a person is
within police custody. In 1986, Carl Thompson was asked to come to
the police station for questioning regarding the murder of his wife.27
The police did not read him his Miranda warning before the
interrogation. 28 Though Mr. Thompson was told repeatedly that he was
free to leave, the police continued to ask him "questions that invited
confession." 29 He confessed to the murder and was convicted. After his
conviction, Mr. Thompson submitted a writ of habeas corpus because
the police did not read him his Miranda rights before questioning.3 ° The
main issue before the Court was whether Mr. Thompson was in custody
when he was interrogated, because he was not owed a Miranda warning
if he was not. The Court developed a two-part test for determining
when someone is in police custody:
Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination
[of custody]: first, what were the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those
circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or
she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and
25. Id. at 479. The entire Miranda warning reads, "You have the right to remain silent.
Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney.
If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for you. Do you understand the rights I have just
read to you? With these rights in mind, do you wish to speak to me?"

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 439.
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 102 (1995).
Id. at 103.
Id.
Id. at 106.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

5

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 10

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 84

leave .. . [T]he court must apply an objective test to
resolve the ultimate inquiry: was there a formal arrest or
of the degree
restraint on freedom of movement
31
associated with a formal arrest.
Put plainly, courts should look at all of the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation to determine whether or not a reasonable person in that
situation would feel he or she was under the control of the police.
E. What Constitutes Interrogation?
In 1980, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify Miranda's definition
of interrogation in Rhode Island v. Innis. 32 When the police arrested
Thomas Innis, he was immediately informed of his Miranda rights and
33
placed in the police car, where he subsequently asked for an attomey.
However, on the way to the police station, the officers openly discussed
the consequences of children finding the missing weapon used during
the murder and robberies they suspected Mr. Innis had committed. Mr.
Innis responded by taking the police to the gun in order to protect the
children. 34 The question for the Court was whether these police
comments amounted to interrogation. The Innis Court broadened the
definition of "interrogation," stating:
"Interrogation," as conceptualized in the Miranda
opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and
beyond that inherent in custody itself . . . [This]
definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the
suspect, rather than the intent of the police . . . . A
practice that the police should know is reasonably likely
to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus
amounts to interrogation . . . . [T]he definition of
interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the
part of the police officers that they should have known
were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response.3 5
This view was very Fifth Amendment focused because it added more
protection for the average American citizen. It "focuse[d] primarily
36
upon the perceptions of the suspect," instead of the intent of the police,
and placed the burden on the police officers to consider when an
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 111.
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
Id.at 294.
Id. at 295.
Id. at 301-02 (emphasis added).
Id.
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interrogatee may feel the pressure to make an incriminating statement.
Although Innis clarified the definition of interrogation, the Supreme
Court still has not clarified the meaning of the word "custodial," which
has created a significant amount of confusion. Half of the circuits have
found that the test for custody has a low bar, holding that if a person
feels he or she is subject to interrogation according to Innis, that person
should be granted the right to remain silent regardless of whether he or
she has been Mirandized.3 7 However, the other half of the circuits have
held that custody means being completely under the control of the
police. 38 Therefore, Fifth Amendment-protected interrogation cannot
occur until someone has been arrested. Under the latter view, Fifth
Amendment protection does not apply until the moment that someone
should be Mirandized.
F. Substantive Evidence v. Impeachment at Trial
The Supreme Court ruled in Doyle v. Ohio that a court may present
evidence of an arrestee's silence pre-Miranda for impeachment
purposes. 39 In the early 1970s, two defendants were caught selling
marijuana to an informant in a police sting. 40 The defendants claimed
that the police informant set them up. 4 1 At trial, the prosecution asked
each defendant why he did not tell the police they were mistaken at the
time of arrest, which the defense challenged as unconstitutional. 42 The
Court held that using a defendant's post-Miranda silence against him at
trial for any reason, including impeachment, would be a deprivation of
the defendant's due process rights. 43 However, it avoided the preMiranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt examined in this
Casenote, which created an assumption that pre-Mirandasilence may be
used as impeachment evidence against a defendant at trial.44
III. CIRCUIT OPINIONS
The U.S. Circuit Courts are split on the issue of what circumstances
amount to custody. Half of the circuits have found that an arrestee is
37. See infra Part III.
38. See infra Part III.
39. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
40. Id. at 612.
41. Id. at 614.
42. Id. at 613.
43. Id. at 618.
44. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618. The end of the Doyle opinion only addresses an interrogatee's
perception of her right to remain silent post-Miranda warning, not whether her pre-Miranda silence
should be used as substantive evidence against her at trial.
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within the custody of the police if that arrestee feels he or she is under
control of the police, and that arrestee has the right to remain silent from
that moment on.4 5 These circuits approach the analysis of the issue from
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, before moving
through to Miranda. Contrarily, the remaining circuits conduct a
reverse analysis, beginning by examining the intent behind the language
in the Miranda opinion and treating Miranda as having defined the
limits of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. As a
result, these circuits have held that the prosecution may introduce
evidence of an arrestee's silence as substantive evidence of guilt because
the right to remain silent is explicit only in the Mirandawarning.4 6
A. Post-Arrest,Pre-MirandaSilence Is Not Substantive Evidence of
Guilt
The circuit courts that do not allow pre-Mirandasilence to be used as
substantive evidence of guilt are the First, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits. The First Circuit is representative of this category.47 The First
Circuit held that introducing a defendant's decision not to speak during
pre-arrest interrogation violates an arrestee's Fifth Amendment rights.
In Coppola v. Powell, Vincent Coppola was suspected of rape. 48 The
police questioned Mr. Coppola and later returned to his home to ask for
a confession, but he refused to confess and asked for attorney
49
representation.
The Coppola court applied three Fifth Amendment principles in order
to determine whether Mr. Coppola's constitutional rights were
violated. 50 The first two principles were taken from Quinn: the court
acknowledged that "the invocation of the right [against selfincrimination] must be given a liberal construction," and "that
invocation of the privilege . . . does not turn on a person's choice of
45. The First, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits do not allow silence to be used as substantive
evidence of guilt at trial.
46. The Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits allow use of an arrestee's silence as
substantive evidence of guilt at trial.
47. See also Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that that if a person is
placed in a situation in which his or her custody status is unclear, the court must first determine whether
the suspect reasonably felt that he or she was in the custody of the police in order to determine whether
silence may be used as substantive evidence of guilt); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d
1011 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that alluding to a defendant's silence pre-Mirandawas a constitutional
violation that must be weighed in collateral review with the other evidence presented at trial); United
States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that a defendant has a right to silence during
pre-custodial interrogation).
48. Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1563 (7th Cir. 1989).
49. Id
50. Id. at 1565.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol84/iss3/10

8

Wamsley: You [Might] Have the Right to Remain Silent: Examining the Mirand

2016]

EXAMINING THE MIRANDA PROBLEM

words.'
Additionally, Coppola included a third principle separate
from Quinn, taken from the Seventh Circuit. 52 It found that "application
of the privilege is not limited to persons in custody or charged with a
crime," a very important distinction within the context of pre-Miranda
silence.53
B. Post-Arrest,Pre-MirandaSilence Can Be Substantive Evidence of
Guilt
On the other hand, half of the circuits do not agree with Coppola.5 4
The Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits allow pre-Miranda
silence to be introduced as substantive evidence of guilt. In 2006, the
Ninth Circuit heard United States v. Lopez and determined that
commenting on a defendant's post-arrest silence at trial does not violate
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination if it only includes
pre-Miranda silence. Jorge Lopez was caught trying to bring drugs into
the United States. 55 At trial, he tried to bring a duress claim to explain
why he had the drugs in his possession.5 6 While Mr. Lopez was on the
witness stand, the prosecution asked him why he had failed to tell
anyone about the duress claim before trial.5 7 Mr. Lopez was found
guilty and appealed on the basis that the prosecutor's question was an
impermissible comment on his post-arrest silence.5 8 The court held that
the question was permissible because it primarily referenced preMiranda silence,59 and the Fifth Amendment does not protect preMiranda silence.
The Ninth Circuit exemplifies the analysis of the courts that allow
pre-Mirandasilence as substantive evidence of guilt. Instead of looking
to the language in the Fifth Amendment, the courts focused on the
phrase "custodial interrogation" and then found that it limits the breadth
of the Fifth Amendment. This is reversed from the analysis of the courts
that do not allow pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt at

51. Id.
52. United States ex reL Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1987).
53. Id. at 1565.
54. See also United States v. Osuna-Zepada, 416 F.3d 838, 840 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that preMiranda, an arrestee does not have the right to silence because of the lack of police-created compulsion
to speak); United States v. Suarez, 162 F. App'x 897, 898 (11 th Cir. 2006) (holding that post-arrest, preMiranda silence may be used as substantive evidence of guilt because an interrogation may only
commence after Mirandawarnings are given by the police).
55. United States v. Lopez, 500 F.3d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 2007).
56. Id. at 843.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 844.
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trial.
IV.

UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT

In February 2015, the Fifth Circuit heard United States v. Wright and
held that a person only has the right to remain silent under Miranda if he
60
or she is actually physically under the control of an arresting agency.
In 2011, police investigated Charles Wright under the suspicion that he
shared child pornography on the internet. 6 1 The investigating officer in
Mr. Wright's case obtained a search warrant on Mr. Wright's home
because child pornography was being shared from an IP address
registered to him. 62 All of the officers on the scene of the search were
wearing "bulletproof vests and/or raid gear," armed, and instructed not
to let anyone leave the premises without permission.6 3 During the
search, the police officers told Mr. Wright they needed to ask him some
questions and he was "escorted to his bedroom so that he could change
into more appropriate clothing." 64 Mr. Wright contended that the
officers walked him to his room to change while holding his arm. 65 The
officers then removed him from his home and took him to their police
car in order to interrogate him. 66 The officers placed him in the front
passenger seat of
the vehicle and took the driver's seat and the backseat
67
for themselves.
During the interview, the police asked Mr. Wright several questions
68
that made him uncomfortable and prompted him to ask for an attorney.
Specifically, he stated, "we're getting into [questions] . . .I should
probably talk to that lawyer first." 69 The police did not call an attorney
for Mr. Wright because he "never [explicitly] requested the presence of
an attorney., 70 He then proceeded to give a significant amount of
incriminating information to the police but refused to answer specific
questions concerning the age of the women in the pornography he
downloaded. 71 The police avoided asking questions that Mr. Wright had
already refused to answer, but continued to explore the subject of his
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

United States v. Wright, 777 F.3d 769, 777 (5th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 771.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wright, 777 F.3d at 771.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 772.
Id.
Wright, 777 F.3d at 773.
Id. at 772.
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porn habits and came close to asking about the ages of the girls several
other times. 72 At trial, the prosecution presented evidence of Mr.
Wright's refusal to answer several questions during the police car
73
interview and argued that this was evidence of a guilty conscience.
Mr. Wright argued that this was an improper comment on his silence
74
because he had invoked his right to remain silent under Miranda.
The court first analyzed whether Mr. Wright had the right to an
75
To
attorney while he was being interrogated in the police car.
determine this issue, it focused on whether the interrogation was
custodial. Several factors were examined, including:
(1) the length of the questioning; (2) the location of the
questioning, (3) the accusatory, or non-accusatory,
nature of the questioning, (4) the amount of restraint on
the individual's physical movement, [and] (5) statements
regarding the individual's freedom to
made by officers
76
leave.
or
move
The court found that the first and third factors leaned in favor of being
custodial because the questioning was extensive and involved Mr.
Wright's criminal activities.77 However, the court felt that remaining
factors seemed to suggest that he was not under the control of the police
at the time of custody.7 8 The court focused on the facts that the police
officers told Mr. Wright that he was free to leave with police
permission, he was not placed into handcuffs, and he was cooperative
throughout the interview to determine that Mr. Wright was not within
the custody of the police at the time of his interrogation.7 9
In the second part of the analysis, the court relied on Doyle to
determine whether the trial court should have suppressed the
80
prosecutor's remarks on Mr. Wright's silence during the interview. It
focused heavily on the timing of the protections and the ambiguity of his
According to the court, Doyle
statements pre-Miranda warning.
protections only apply once an arrestee has been read the Miranda

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 773.
75. Specifically, the court used Edwards v. Ariz., 451 U.S. 477 (1981), to examine Mr. Wright's
case through the Miranda-Edwardsguarantee. Through this guarantee, an arrestee is entitled to an
attorney during custodial interrogation the moment he or she asks for one, and the police may not
continue the interrogation until an attorney is present.
76. Wright, 777 F.3d at 775 (internal citations omitted).
77. Id. at 776.
78. Id. at 776-77.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 777.
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warning. 8 1 The court stated that "it is not the arrest and custody that
trigger Doyle
protections, but rather the assurance of Miranda
82
warnings."
In short, the Wright court imposed a burden on an arrestee to
adamantly assert their innocence pre-Mirandabecause an arrestee does
not have the right to remain silent before that moment. An arrestee's
options pre-Miranda are to confess, lie to the police, or stay silent and
have that silence used against them as substantive evidence of guilt.
V. ANALYSIS

This Part conducts a deep analysis of Miranda, how the Wright court
applied Miranda, and the effect Miranda has had on the circuits within
this circuit split. It specifically addresses the history of why the issue of
presenting pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence at trial is
constitutionally barred. It offers two solutions to the problem Miranda
creates: first, a test that clarifies the holding in Miranda; and second, an
option that moves beyond Miranda into solving more modem issues.
A. Unintended Consequences
Miranda has unintentionally created a gray area between arrest and
the Miranda warning in which the police may infringe upon a citizen's
right to remain silent. As long as the police claim that an interrogatee is
free to leave, it is unlikely the courts will find that he or she is under the
control of the police.8 3 This provides the police with a very broad net.
The way the Miranda warning is currently structured allows the police
to argue that they were only speaking with an interrogatee or holding a
conversation around them when the interrogatee decided to volunteer
information about the crime. This also allows the police to argue that a
truly innocent person would shout about his or her innocence until the
police informed him or her that they would be engaging in interrogation.
However, it no longer prevents the police from denying an arrestee's
right to remain silent during custodial interrogation because that issue
has almost been eradicated-there is almost nothing to prevent. 84
The problem Miranda addresses no longer exists, but a new one has
been created. The Supreme Court has dealt with cases that have created
constitutional infringement before-for example, forced integration of

81.
82.
83.
84.

Wright, 777 F.3d at 778.
Id.
Id. at 776. The Court stated that it was "crucial" to the analysis.
See Leo, supra note 1.
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schools. 85 At the time Brown v. Board of Education86 was decided, the
United States was dealing with segPegation of schools and the Jim Crow
laws. Brown declared that segregation was illegal, and was followed by87
laws.
Keyes v. School District, which enacted forced desegregation
Although these laws adequately dealt with the segregation issue, schools
eventually stopped trying to intentionally segregate themselves, and the
problem was largely fixed. Thirty-four years after the desegregation
laws were implemented, intentional segregation was almost
nonexistent. 88 The courts were simply applying racial classifications to
schoolchildren and placing them in districts based on their race-a
completely new problem. 89 The Court addressed this new issue in
ParentsInvolved in Community School v. Seattle School. District No. 1
and determined that the issue addressed in Brown was now remedied
sufficiently to remove the desegregation laws in order to prevent
infringing upon the constitutional rights of schoolchildren.9" This
reasoning should be transferred to the Mirandaproblem.
The difficulty with Miranda in modem terms is that the Court did not
consider the confusion its language would create. The Miranda opinion
should be treated as a trial run and adjusted accordingly. For example,
Justice Warren used the phrase "once warnings have been given" to
explain what a citizen's rights are in relation to police conduct once a
defendant is in custodial interrogation. 91 The issue with this phrase is
that courts have interpreted it as meaning that a citizen does not have
those rights until he or she is in custodial interrogation, whereas Justice
Warren likely meant it as a reminder to the police that they must issue
the warning if they wish to speak to a suspect about his or her crime.
The Miranda Court was attempting to broaden the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination, not create an unclear timing issue about
when it should be applicable. 92 The Miranda Court never meant to
create this problem.
B. Two Approaches
Unclear language between the Fifth Amendment and Miranda has
85. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007)
(holding that racial imbalances within schools are not themselves unconstitutional and should only be
subject to desegregation laws if they are caused by intentional segregation).
86. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
87. Keyes v. Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
88. See generally ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. 701.
89. Id. at 713.
90. Id. at 748.
91. Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436, 473 (1966).
92. See generally id.
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caused half of the circuits to allow the admission of evidence of an
interrogatee's pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt at trial.93
Miranda established a warning that must be given to each suspect before
the police can engage in custodial interrogation. Several experts in the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination field agree that the
Miranda warnings should be revamped in order to consider the
questions posed in this article. 94 One proposed revision to the warning
states:
[T]he first two warnings, relating to the right to silence,
should be buttressed by a new "right to silence" warning
that would provide something to the effect of: "If you
choose to remain silent, your silence will not be used
against [you] as evidence to suggest that you committed
a crime simply because you refused to speak." 95
This amendment would clarify not only the rights of the arrestee, but
also the analysis of courts trying to interpret whether or not the arrestee
had the right to remain silent. 96 Adopting this version of the beginning
of Mirandawarnings would be a temporary solution, and the first step in
the right direction to clarifying the substantive evidence of guilt issue.
There are two separate approaches courts could adopt that would
feasibly address the pre-Mirandasilence issue at trial. The first involves
an approach that initially determines whether an arrestee was subject to
custodial interrogation, and then examines whether he or she adequately
invoked the Fifth Amendment. This approach preserves the language of
Miranda and may be easier to implement. The second, more effective,
approach is for courts to ignore the issue of custody and, instead, focus
on whether the arrestee is subject to interrogation according to Innis.9 7
This second approach involves the Supreme Court granting certiorari on
the issue and overruling the part of Miranda that focuses on the custody
of the interrogatee. Either way, the right against self-incrimination
should be approached through the Fifth Amendment instead of Miranda
in order to avoid issuing a high court opinion that would promote giving
interrogatees the choice of either lying to the police or incriminating
themselves.

93. See supranote 46.
94. See Leo, supra note 1; Mark. A Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of
ContemporaryLaw and Understandings,90 MINN. L. REV. 781 (2006).
95. Godsey, supra note 94, at 783.
96. Id.at 784.
97. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
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1. Broadening "Custody"
The first proposed solution is a three-prong test that examines the
amount of control exerted on an arrestee and the likelihood that an
This solution
arrestee will make an incriminating statement.
pertinent to
cases
Court
incorporates tests from three of the Supreme
98
this issue-Keohane,Innis, and Quinn.
First, courts should ask if the arrestee was in the custody of the police
under the Keohane test.99 Second, if the arrestee was in the custody of
the police, it should then ask if he or she was being interrogated
according to the Innis test. 100 If the answer to both of these questions is
"yes," the arrestee was subject to custodial interrogation and was
protected under both the Fifth Amendment and Miranda. This part of
the test combines Keohane and Innis to show that the definition of
custody, as treated by the Supreme Court, is broader than the definition
applied by the lower courts. Finally, if custodial interrogation occurred,
courts should then ask if the interrogatee sufficiently invoked his or her
self-incrimination during interrogation in
Fifth Amendment right against
1 1
Quinn.
with
accordance
a. Keohane
The first prong of the proposed test incorporates the Keohane test,
which examines the circumstances surrounding the police interaction
and whether a reasonable person would have felt he or she could leave
the situation.
The first part of the Keohane test addresses the interrogatee's
circumstances. As applied to Wright, Mr. Wright was in his house in the
middle of the night when a police raid team barged in. He was escorted
throughout his home and, although he technically was not under arrest,
he was never able to leave the company of a police officer.
Additionally, he was only allowed to leave the premises after express
permission from the police. He was taken out of his home and into a
in the front seat and subjected to
police vehicle, where he was 1placed
02
questions
incriminating
several
This part of the Keohane test also examines physical control of the
arrestee. The Wright court focused on Mr. Wright's ability to leave the

98.
99 (1995);
99.
100.
101.
102.

See generally Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S.
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02; see also supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
See Quinn, 349 U.S. at 163; see also supranotes 20-21.
See generally United States v. Wright, 777 F.3d 769 (5th Cir. 2015).
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premises as indicia of the police's lack of control over his person.
Although Mr. Wright was theoretically allowed to leave, the reality of
the situation is that police-who wanted to prosecute him for a serious
crime-invaded his home. Part of the purpose of Miranda is to relieve
pressure placed on an arrestee to speak to the police. Holding that Mr.
Wright was not under the control of the police because he was free to
leave ignores the policy behind Miranda. This is a step backwards
towards gross misapplication of the Fifth Amendment.
The second part of the Keohane test examines whether or not a
reasonable person should have felt that he or she could leave the
situation. The Wright court erred in its analysis when it found that Mr.
Wright should have felt that he could leave the interview conducted in
the police car. Nothing about his situation should have indicated to Mr.
Wright that the police were simply entertaining the idea that he was
sharing child pornography. He probably felt the police believed he was
guilty and likely was terrified; an entire team of police was tearing apart
his home dressed in riot gear, and he was inside of a police car
answering their questions. Mr. Wright likely felt that he was in the
custody of the police because they were asking him about his porn
habits, accusing him of looking at illegal child porn, and tearing apart
his house in the process. The court should have found that Mr. Wright
was in custody of the police according to Keohane.
b. Interrogation
The second prong of the proposed test incorporates Innis. In essence,
the Wright court imposed its own objective test on the arrestee's
perception of the interrogation instead of the subjective test imposed by
Innis. The Innis test asks whether the police conduct would foreseeably
elicit an incriminating statement from an interrogatee. If it would, then
it is sufficient interrogation under Innis to require a Miranda warning.
In this instance, the police removed Mr. Wright from his home and
took him to their police car. This was not a neutral location-it was the
only available location controlled by the police. During the time that
Mr. Wright was in the car, the police asked him several questions about
his porn habits, specifically whether or not he had ever looked for child
porn. Although these questions were clearly intended to elicit a
confession, the focus of the analysis was placed on the custody status of
Mr. Wright, finding that he was not being interrogated because of a lack
of compulsion to speak to the police. The court was mistaken in its
analysis of Mr. Wright's interrogation. To hold that this was anything
other than interrogation would severely limit the holding in Innis, which
the Fifth Circuit obviously does not have the power to do. The Wright
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court was wrong not to look at the subjective view of Mr. Wright. His
belief that the police were interrogating him was completely reasonable
under the circumstances and should have been taken into account at
trial.
c. Invocation of the Fifth Amendment
The analysis of whether an interrogatee has invoked their Fifth
Amendment rights is much simpler than the previous two prongs.
Quinn held that an arrestee's invocation of their Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination can be invoked when the police, in any way,
could construe an invocation of the right.' 0 3 An arrestee does not need
to explicitly ask for an attorney or express his desire to stay silent.
However, in Wright, Mr. Wright explicitly asked for an attorney as soon
as he felt uncomfortable. This act should have signaled to the police
that he wished to remain silent and caused them to bring him to the
police station, call an attorney, and wait to continue questioning him
until after they had complied with his Mirandarights.
2. Interrogation and the Fifth Amendment
Although the issue involving silence as substantive evidence of guilt
at trial may be solved by broadening the definition of "custody," a
clearer test would eliminate the custody issue altogether. If the police
are speaking to someone they suspect may be involved in a crime and
are engaging in behavior that amounts to interrogation under Innis, that
suspect should be able to invoke their right against self-incrimination
without the danger of the invocation being introduced as substantive
evidence of her guilt at trial.
The main issue with this circuit split is the courts' application of
Miranda within the context of the Fifth Amendment. Courts holding
that silence may not be used as substantive evidence of guilt look to the
Fifth Amendment for guidance, while other courts have taken a textual
approach to Miranda. Miranda caused so much confusion that a
substantial jurisprudence on the meaning of the word "custodial" has
developed. In fact, the majority opinion in Keohane focused mainly on
how to determine when an arrestee is within the custody of the police.
The idea of custody should not be the focus of the analysis of the
courts-the nature of the interrogation should be.
A better approach to the right against self-incrimination is to remove
Keohane from the earlier proposed test. The more important prong

103. See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 164 (1955).
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examines whether or not the police were (a) soliciting an incriminating
statement or (b) should have known that their words or actions were
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Instead of asking
whether or not an interrogatee was within the custody of the police, the
courts should assess the type of questions the police were asking. This
analysis involves first looking at the situation from a more objective
standpoint to determine the intent behind the questioning. At the outset,
courts should ask whether the interrogatee was a suspect or involved in
the crime in some way.
In this approach, the right to silence need not apply if the police were
simply speaking to a person without attempting to elicit incriminating
information. 10 4 Allowing everyone to stay silent when speaking to the
police would seriously inhibit law enforcement's ability to investigate
crimes. The standard should be whether or not the police are speaking
to the interrogatee as a suspect.10 5 For example, consider Mr. Wright's
situation in Wright. If there is agreement with the court's opinion, the
Fifth Amendment should not protect Mr. Wright because he was not
within the custody of the police at the time of his interrogation.
However, the Fifth Amendment was not written with the language
"custodial interrogation" in mind-it was written because the Founders
wanted to remove an interrogatee's compulsion to make selfincriminating statements. Alternatively, Miranda was written with the
language of the Fifth Amendment at the forefront of the opinion. When
one considers that the Fifth Amendment is the controlling authority, the
question is clearer: Why does it matter whether the interrogatee was in
the custody of the police? It should not matter, because the Fifth
Amendment grants citizens the right against self-incrimination without
10 6
qualifying that statement with the word "custodial."'
The second proposed test mirrors the first proposed test in all respects
except for the first prong. It dismisses the issue of custody and, instead,
focuses on the nature of the interrogation to determine whether or not
the interrogatee reasonably felt that he or she should invoke the right
against self-incrimination. Once this is determined, the test applies Innis
and Quinn.
While at first glance, the proposed test appears to overrule part of
Miranda, this test instead upholds the Court's general intent in the

104. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 302. "[T]he definition of interrogation can extend only to words or
actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response."
105. Id. Innis clearly focuses on the intent of the police when questioning an interrogatee.
Examining whether someone was a suspect at the time he or she was interrogated would help clarify the
reasonable person standard applied to the interrogatee in Innis.
106. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Miranda opinion. This is evidenced by language within the opinion.
First, Miranda imposes a duty upon the police to give a "warning" of the
interrogatee's already existing rights.10 7 The Court doesn't create a
right to remain silent-it seeks to educate interrogatees about their
rights. 10 8 At no point does the opinion attempt to create a right not
already contained within the Constitution.
Second, the Miranda Court did not seek to limit the Fifth
Amendment. To the contrary, it acknowledged the Fifth Amendment's
breadth. It expressly stated that the right against self-incrimination is
"as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard."' 1 9 This
language also suggests that the Court was not creating a right or limiting
the Fifth Amendment, but rather ensuring its application to
interrogation. The issue was not that citizens did not have the right to
remain silent, but that they were not aware exactly how far their right
against self-incrimination reached.
Finally, Miranda focuses on awareness of the right, not the timing of
its attachment. Again, the bulk of Miranda is based on discussing a
right that existed prior to that holding. This suggests that a citizen
always has the right to remain silent in the face of incrimination, but
imposes a duty on the police to remind arrestees of their rights because
of the stress inherent in a custodial interrogation. Unfortunately, the
phrasing of Miranda had the unintended effect of limiting rights found
in the Fifth Amendment.
If the Wright court had applied this test, the analysis would have been
significantly more compliant with the right against self-incrimination.
The court would have initially determined that Mr. Wright was a suspect
based on the police raiding his home. It would have moved on to
determine whether or not the police were asking questions that invite
confession and determined that Mr. Wright was being interrogated
according to the Innis test. At this point, the right to remain silent would
have attached. To finish its analysis, the court would have determined
that Mr. Wright invoked his right against self-incrimination by
expressing his discomfort in answering questions without an attorney
present. The issue would have been much simpler, and Mr. Wright's
constitutional right against self-incrimination would have been
preserved.

107. See Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436, 512 (1966). The Court set a standard that an
interrogatee must be "distinctly aware" of his or her right not to speak.
108. Id.
109. Id. at459-60.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Either of the proposed solutions would be better than the test applied
by the Wright court. The first solution limits the change that would need
to be effectuated by the court in clarifying the pre-Miranda silence
issue. This would be an easy decision for the court-it needs only apply
parts of Keohane, Innis, and Quinn to create a test. This test would
make it easier for lower courts to interpret cases and produce uniform
opinions. However, imposing this test could still create confusion
between the lower courts.
The second proposed test would clarify the issues caused by Miranda.
Courts allowing pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt
have relied too heavily on Miranda and have begun to forget the spirit
behind the Fifth Amendment. A better method is to focus on the intent
of the police when questioning the interrogatee to determine whether an
interrogation actually occurred. It should not matter whether someone is
within the control of the police as long as the police ask questions that
invite confession or incrimination. The focus on custody has clouded
the ultimate issue and likely contributed to the wrongful conviction of
Americans.
Under either proposed solution, the Wright court would have held that
the Fifth Amendment protected Mr. Wright during the police car
interrogation. Mr. Wright was within the control of the police, so his
circumstances were sufficient to satisfy the Keohane test. More
importantly, the police asked Mr. Wright questions that would cause a
reasonable person to feel that the police were looking for a confession.
He adequately invoked his right against self-incrimination when he
expressed his discomfort in answering the questions posed to him by the
police.
In conclusion, Miranda has confused the courts for long enough. The
Supreme Court should grant certiorari on this issue and view the cases
through the lens of the Fifth Amendment. The right against selfincrimination was not included exclusively to protect citizens under
arrest, but rather to ensure that no one was placed in that situation.
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